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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee: 
 
I am pleased to testify in support of both H.R. 200, the Helping Families Save 
Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, and H.R. 225, the Emergency Homeownership 
and Equity Protection Act, legislation proposed by Representatives Conyers and Miller 
that would significantly help ease the nationwide foreclosure crisis and stabilize financial 
markets. 
There are four major points I wish to make in my written testimony: 
1. Voluntary, private-market efforts to address the foreclosure crisis have all 
failed.   
2. Bankruptcy is the only method that can fully address the contractual and 
incentive problems created by securitization.   
3. Bankruptcy modification of mortgages will not result in higher mortgage 
interest rates or less credit availability.   
4. Bankruptcy modification of mortgages does not create moral hazard or 
unjust windfalls. 
 
I.   VOLUNTARY PRIVATE MARKET EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS HAVE FAILED 
A.   The Foreclosure Crisis and the Financial Crisis 
The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented home foreclosure crisis.  At 
no time since the Great Depression have so many Americans been in jeopardy of losing 
their homes.  Over a million homes entered foreclosure in 20071 and another 1.7 million 
in the first three quarters of 2008.2  Over half of a million homes were actually sold in 
foreclosure or otherwise surrendered to lenders in 2007, and over seven hundred 
thousand were sold in foreclosure in the first three quarters of 2008 alone.3 At the end of 
the third quarter of 2008, one in ten homeowners was either past due or in foreclosure, 
the highest levels on record.4   Already nearly 20% of homeowners have negative equity 
                                              
1 RealtyTrac, Press Release, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent In 2007, Jan. 29, 
2008, at 
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt=64
847.  
2 HOPE Now, Workout Plans (Repayment Plans + Modifications) and Foreclosure Sales, July 
2007 - November 2008, at 
http://www.hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE%20NOW%20Loss%20Mitigation%20National%20Dat
a%20July%2007%20to%20November%2008.pdf.  See also Chris Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage 
Defaults, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES – (2009) (forthcoming) (1.2 million foreclosure starts in first half of 
2008). 
3 E-mail from Daren Blomquist, RealtyTrac, Inc. to author, March 7, 2008 (on file with author).  
4 Mortgage Bankers Association, Press Release, Delinquencies Increase, Foreclosure Starts Flat in 
Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey, Dec. 5, 2008, 
athttp://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/66626.htm.  2.97% of all one-to-four family 
residential mortgages outstanding were in the foreclosure process in the first quarter of 2008, and 6.99% 
were delinquent.  Id.  See also Vikas Bajaj & Michael Grynbaum, About 1 in 11 Mortgageholders Face 
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in their homes,5 and by the time the housing market stabilizes, 40% of homeowners will 
have negative equity positions.6  By 2012, Credit Suisse predicts, around 8.1 million 
homes, or 16% of all residential borrowers could go through foreclosure. 7  In other words 
one in every nine homeowners—and one in six households who have a mortgage—will 
lose their home to foreclosure. 
Chart 1:  Percentage of 1-4 Family Residential Mortgages in Foreclosure Process8 
 
The sheer number of foreclosures should be alarming because foreclosures create 
significant deadweight loss.9  Historically, lenders are estimated to lose 40% - 50% of 
their investment in a foreclosure situation,10 and in the current market, even greater losses 
are expected.11  Borrowers lose their homes and are forced to relocate, often to new 
communities.  Foreclosure is an undesirable outcome for borrowers and lenders.  
                                                                                                                                      
Problems, N.Y.TIMES, June 6, 2008.   Because of the steadily increasing level of homeownership in the US, 
see U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS), Table 14, higher 
percentages of past due and foreclosed mortgage means that an even greater percentage of Americans are 
directly affected by higher delinquency and foreclosure rates.   
5 James R. Hagerty, Nevada Has Highest Percentage of “Under Water” Households, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 30, 2008; see also James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Pain Gauge:  Nearly 1 in 6 Owners 
“Under Water”, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008.   
6 Ruth Simon, Rescue Includes Steps to Help Borrowers Keep Homes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 
2008.   
7 Credit Suisse, Foreclosure Update: over 8 million foreclosures expected, Fixed Income 
Research, Dec. 4, 2008. Even Credit Suisse’s best-case scenario still involves 6.3 million foreclosures.  Id. 
8 Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Surveys.   
9 Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Value of Foreclosed Property, 28 J. OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 
194-95 (2006) (surveying estimates of deadweight loss on foreclosure).   
10 Comments of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Ask the White House, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20071207.html.  
11 Fitch Ratings, Revised Loss Expectations for 2006 and 2007 Subprime Vintage Collateral, 
Residential Mortgage Criteria Report, Mar. 25, 2008.  
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Foreclosures also have major third-party externalities.  When families have to 
move to new homes, community ties are rent asunder.  Friendships, religious 
congregations, schooling, childcare, medical care, transportation, and even employment 
often depend on geography.12   Homes root people in strong networks of community ties, 
and foreclosures destroy these key social bonds.   
Foreclosures also depress housing and commercial real estate prices throughout 
entire neighborhoods.  There is, on average, a $3,000 property value decline for each of 
the closest fifty neighbors of a foreclosed property.13  The property value declines caused 
by foreclosure hurt local businesses and erode state and local government tax bases.14  
Condominium and homeowner associations likewise find their assessment base reduced 
by foreclosures, leaving the remaining homeowners with higher assessments.15  
Foreclosed properties also impose significant direct costs on local governments 
and foster crime.16  A single foreclosure can cost the city of Chicago over $30,000.17  
Moreover, foreclosures have a racially disparate impact because African-Americans 
invest a higher share of their wealth in their homes18 and are also more likely than 
financially similar whites to have subprime loans.19   
                                              
12 See Phillip Lovell & Julia Isaacs, The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on Children, at 
http://www.firstfocus.net/Download/HousingandChildrenFINAL.pdf (estimating two million children will 
be impacted by foreclosures, based on a projection of two and quarter million foreclosures). 
13 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure:  The Impact of Single-
Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57 (2006); Mark Duda & 
William C. Apgar, Mortgage Foreclosures in Atlanta:  Patterns and Policy Issues, A Report Prepared for 
NeighborWorks America, December 15, 2005, at 
www.nw.org/Network/neighborworksprogs/foreclosuresolutions/documents/foreclosure1205.pdf; Amy 
Ellen Schwartz et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress Neighborhood Property Values?, 
NYU Law School Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-04; NYU Law School, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 05-02 (Mar. 2005). 
14 Laura Johnston, Vacant Properties Cost Cleveland $35 Million, Study Says, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Feb. 19, 2008; Global Insight, The Mortgage Crisis:  Economic and Fiscal Implications for Metro 
Areas, Report Prepared for The United States Conference of Mayors and The Council for the New 
American City, 2007, at   
http://www.vacantproperties.org/resources/documents/USCMmortgagereport.pdf. 
15 Christine Haughney, Collateral Foreclosure Damage for Condo Owners, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2008.   
16 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on 
Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUDIES, 851 (2006); William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, Collateral 
Damage:  The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom, May 11, 2005, at 
http://www.995hope.org/content/pdf/Apgar_Duda_Study_Short_Version.pdf.  
17 William C. Apgar et al., The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study, Feb. 27, 
2005, Homeownership Preservation Foundation Housing Finance Policy Research Paper Number 2005-1, 
at www.995hope.org/content/pdf/Apgar_Duda_Study_Full_Version.pdf. 
18 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 66 (2006) (housing equity accounted for 62.5% of all black assets in 
1988, but only 43.3% of white assets, even though black homeownership rates were 43% and white 
homeownership rates were 65%).  See also Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, & Kevin B. Moore, 
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 2006, at A8, A12, A23 (noting that while there was only a $35,000 difference in 
median home equity between whites and nonwhites/Hispanics in 2004, there was a $115,900 difference in 
median net worth and a $33,700 difference in median financial assets.  This suggests that for minority 
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The foreclosure crisis has also been at the root of a larger financial crisis.  
Because most residential mortgages are securitized into widely held securities, 
unprecedented default rates in the residential mortgage market affect not just mortgage 
lenders, but capital markets globally.  The marketwide impact of defaults on mortgage-
backed securities have been amplified by poorly understood and complex derivative 
products that are bought and sold by financial institutions, which now find themselves 
insufficiently liquid or undercapitalized.  This in turn has led to a global credit crisis as 
financial institutions have become hesitant to contract not knowing their counterparties’ 
ultimate solvency.   
As long as foreclosures continue at unabated rates, mortgage defaults will 
continue to rise as foreclosures depress real estate prices, fueling the cycle.  Until housing 
prices stabilize, we will not see stability in the financial system, and housing prices 
cannot stabilize unless the tide of foreclosures is stemmed.  In short, foreclosure is an 
inefficient outcome that is bad not only for lenders and borrowers, but for society at 
large.   
B.  Loss Mitigation Options on Defaulted Loans 
 Foreclosure, of course, is never mandatory.  It is only one possibility among a set 
of loss mitigation options for a lender confronted with a defaulted loan.  A lender always 
has the option of forbearing or of modifying the terms of a non-performing loan so that it 
can perform under less onerous terms.20  Indeed, so long as the losses from a 
modification would be less than those from foreclosure, modification is the efficient 
economic outcome for a non-performing loan.  Given the sizeable losses lenders incur in 
foreclosure, one would expect lenders to be making significant modifications to loans, 
including reduction of principal and interest.   
                                                                                                                                      
homeowners, wealth is disproportionately invested in the home.); Kai Wright, The Subprime Swindle, THE 
NATION, July 14, 2008. 
19 Bob Tedeschi, Subprime Loans’ Wide Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008; Mary Kane, Race and 
the Housing Crisis, THE WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT, July 25, 2008. 
20 Refinancing, a traditional route of dealing with non-performing loans, is generally not possible 
because so many defaulting homeowners have negative equity.  Other loss mitigation methods, such as 
short sales, however, have been widely used.  
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Chart 2:  Workouts to Foreclosures by Type, HOPE Now Alliance Members,21 
 
Chart 3:  Loan Modifications, Repayment Plans, and Foreclosures in National 
Banks’ and Federal Thrifts’ Servicing Portfolios, 200822 
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Yet, to date, there have been relatively few voluntary, private modifications of 
non-performing loans.  As Chart 2 shows, the workouts performed by the HOPE Now 
Alliance have failed to keep pace with foreclosures.  Chart 3 presents a similar picture for 
a select group of national banks and federal thrifts that comprise around 60% of the total 
                                              
21 HOPE Now, HOPE NOW Loss Mitigation National Data July 07 to November 08, at 
http://www.hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE%20NOW%20Loss%20Mitigation%20National%20Dat
a%20July%2007%20to%20November%2008.pdf; Author’s Calculations. 
22 Office of Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS 
Mortgage Metrics Report, Sept. 12, 2008, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-105a.pdf. 
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servicing portfolios nationwide.  Moreover, as both Charts 2 and 3 show, most of the 
workouts have been repayment plans, in which the arrearage is simply reamortized into 
the remaining term of the loan or tacked on at the end, thereby increasing or at best 
holding steady the borrower’s monthly payments.  While repayment plans are sensible 
solutions to temporary disruptions in the borrower’s cash flow, they are wholly 
inadequate responses to the key problems of the current mortgage market—payment reset 
shock and negative equity.  Payment reset shock from an adjustable rate mortgage or 
negative amortization trigger in an option-ARM can only be addressed by modifications 
that freeze or lower monthly payments, which requires a reduction in the interest rate or 
principal of the loan.  Likewise, negative equity positions can only be corrected through 
principal write-downs. 
Even among the modifications, the vast majority fail to reduce monthly payments, 
making them near worthless.23  As the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group has 
noted,  
one out of five loan modifications made in the past year are currently 
delinquent.  The high number of previously-modified loans currently 
delinquent indicates that significant numbers of modifications offered to 
homeowners have not been sustainable…. [M]any loan modifications are 
not providing any monthly payment relief to struggling homeowners. 
…[U]nrealistic or “band-aid” modifications have only exacerbated and 
prolonged the current foreclosure crisis.24 
The failure of existing loan modification programs is not surprising—most loan 
modifications do not change monthly payments or even increase monthly payments.  
Less than 20% of voluntary loss mitigation efforts rarely reduce monthly mortgage 
payments according to a study by Professor Alan White of Valparaiso University Law 
School.25  Likewise, the Center for Responsible lending estimates that under 20% of 
HOPE Now loan modifications result in lower monthly payments.26 
Unrealistic modifications have been a problem not just for the subprime loans 
examined by the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, but also for the 
predominantly non-subprime loans held in Fannie Mae’s portfolio or securitized by 
Fannie Mae, the vast majority of loan workouts have been through Fannie’s “HomeSaver 
Loan” program, which involves making defaulted homeowners a new unsecured loan for 
                                              
23 Testimony of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley before the U.S. House Financial 
Services Committee, Sept. 17, 2008 (noting that “virtually none” of the loan modifications reviewed by her 
office reduced monthly payments)  
24 State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing 
Performance, Data Report No. 3, Sept. 2008, at 
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/SFPWGReport3.pdf, at 3. 
25 Alan M. White, Deleveraging American Homeowners: December 18,2008 Update to August 
2008 Report, Valparaiso University School of Law (December 18, 2008) available at 
http://www.hastingsgroup.com/Whiteupdate.pdf; Alan M. White, Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on 
Voluntary Mortgage Modifications from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, FORDHAM URBAN L.J. (2009)  
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259538. 
26 Sonia Garrison et al., Continued Decay and Shaky Repairs:  The State of Subprime Loans 
Today, Center for Responsible Lending, Jan. 2009, 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/continued_decay_and_shaky_repairs.pdf. 
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up to $15,000 to cover the deficiency on their mortgage loan.  The HomeSaver program 
thus increases financially distressed homeowners’ debt burdens while masking non-
performing loans.  At best, HomeSaver is a bridge-loan program that buys time until a 
modification can be done, but given that Fannie Mae is carrying the HomeSaver Loans 
on its books at about 2% of their face value,27 it clearly expects near universal default and 
no recovery on these loans.   
The federal government’s foreclosure prevention programs have even more 
dismal results.  The FHA’s FHASecure program, which was intended to let borrowers 
with non-FHA adjustable rate and interest-only mortgages refinance into fixed-rate FHA 
loans has only helped has only helped a few thousand delinquent homeowners,28 not the 
240,000 predicted.29 Likewise, the HOPE for Homeowners program, established by 
Congress in July 2008 to permit FHA insurance of refinanced distressed mortgages, and 
predicted to help 400,000 homeowners, had as of mid-December 2008 attracted only 312 
applications,30 and not actually refinanced any mortgages,31 in part because of its reliance 
on private market cooperation to do voluntary principal write-downs.32 
Similarly, the Streamlined Loan Modification Program (SMP) adopted by the 
GSEs (in conservatorship) is set up to fail.33  The SMP does not require any 
modifications, but instead merely sets a target for modified loan payments (principal, 
interest, taxes, insurance) to be no more than 38% of gross monthly income (front-end 
DTI).  Putting aside whether it makes sense to do modifications based only on front-end 
DTI, ignoring back-end DTI (total monthly debt payments to gross monthly income), the 
SMP’s front-end DTI target is grossly inadequate and has already been rejected as 
resulting in unsustainable loan modifications by leading elements of the mortgage 
servicing industry have already abandoned as resulting in unsustainable modifications.  
Litton Loan Servicing, a Goldman Sachs affiliate, uses 31% front-end DTI as its initial 
target,34 FDIC has proposed a general modification program using a 31% front-end DTI 
                                              
27 Kate Berry, Lending Model Gets Reworked at Fannie Mae, AM. BANKER, Nov. 11, 2008 ($301 
million in HomeSaver loans being carried at $7 million fair market value). 
28 Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 
2008. 
29 See, e.g., Press Release, US Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, Bush Administration to 
Help Nearly One-Quarter of a Million Homeowners Refinance, Keep Their Homes; FHA to implement 
new “FHASecure” refinancing product (Aug. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr07-123.cfm; Press Release, US Dep’t of Housing and 
Urban Development, FHA Helps 400,000 Families Find Mortgage Relief; Refinancing on pace to help 
half-million homeowners by year’s end (Oct. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr08-167.cfm. 
30 Dina ElBoghdady, HUD Chief Calls Aid on Mortgages a Failure, WASH. POST. Dec. 17, 2008, 
at A1, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121603177.html.   
31 Tamara Keith, Despite Program, No Hope for Homeowners, National Public Radio, Dec. 17, 
2008, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98409330. 
32 Adam J. Levitin, Flaws in the FHA Housing Bill, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2008.   
33 The SMP standard has also been adopted voluntarily by the HOPE Now alliance of servicers is 
an entirely voluntary program. 
34 Oversight of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act: Examining Financial Institution Use 
of Funding Under the Capital Purchase Program: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (Nov. 13 2008) (testimony of Gregory Palm), available 
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target,35 and Bank of America/Countrywide’s settlement with the state Attorneys General 
requires use of a 25%-34% front-end DTI standard.36  The GSEs’ own initial 
underwriting guidelines suggest a maximum 25%-28% front-end DTI.37  If the GSEs do 
not believe that 38% DTI is prudent underwriting for a loan to begin with, it is not clear 
why they would use 38% DTI as a modification target, especially as most loans already 
have a front-end DTI of less than 38%.38  Only around 10-15% of prime loans and alt-A 
and 25-30% of subprime loans are already above this threshold.39  SMP consists largely 
of suggesting a standard so low that most troubled loans already comply with it.  
All voluntary foreclosure mitigation efforts to date have failed, as have federally-
sponsored efforts, which have been reliant on private market cooperation.  As the State 
Foreclosure Prevention Working Group has noted, “[n]early eight out of ten seriously 
delinquent homeowners are not on track for any loss mitigation outcome,” and “[n]ew 
efforts to prevent foreclosures are on the decline, despite a temporary increase in loan 
modifications through the [second quarter] of 2008.40   
 
II.   BANKRUPTCY MODIFICATION IS THE ONLY WAY TO ADDRESS THE OBSTACLES 
TO MORTGAGE MODIFICATION CREATED BY SECURITIZATION 
A major factor complicating private, voluntary loan modification efforts is 
securitization.  The vast majority, somewhere upwards of 80%, of residential mortgages 
are securitized.  Understanding securitization is key to understanding why private, 
voluntary efforts at mortgage modification will inevitably fail and why bankruptcy 
modification presents the only sure method of preventing preventable foreclosures.   
Securitization transactions are technical, complex deals, but the core of the 
transaction is fairly simple.  A financial institution owns a pool of mortgage loans, which 
it either made itself or purchased.  Rather than hold these mortgage loans (and the credit 
risk) on its own books, it sells them to a specially created entity, typically a trust (SPV).  
The trust pays for the mortgage loans by issuing bonds.  The bonds are collateralized 
(backed) by the loans now owned by the trust.  These bonds are so-called mortgage-
backed securities (MBS).   
Because the trust is just a shell to hold the loans and put them beyond the reach of 
the financial institution’s creditors, a third-party must be brought in to manage the loans.  
This third-party is called a servicer.  The servicer is supposed to manage the loans for the 
                                                                                                                                      
at: http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.LiveStream&Hearing_id=1d38de7d-
67db-4614-965b-edf5749f1fa3, at minutes 143-144. 
35 FDIC, FDIC Loss Sharing Proposal to Promote Affordable Loan Modifications, at 
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/index.html (proposed Nov. 14, 2008). 
36 Stipulated Judgment & Injunction, California v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC083076, Cal. 
Sup. Ct., L.A. County, NW District, Oct. 20, 2008, at 14, available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1618_cw_judgment.pdf. 
37 Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide Section Section 37.15.  
38 Admittedly, DTI reporting is of questionable accuracy.   
39 Merrill Lynch, MBS / ABS Special Report, Loan Modifications: What Investors Need to Know, 
Nov. 21, 2008, at 7.  Reliance on DTI is itself questionable; loan performance seems to correlate better to 
loan-to-value ratio than front-end DTI.  Id. 
40 State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, supra note 24, at 2.  
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benefit of the MBS holders.  The servicer performs the day-to-day tasks related to the 
mortgages owned by the SPV, such as collecting payments, handling paperwork, 
foreclosing, and selling foreclosed properties.  These servicers are the entities that 
actually consider loan modification requests. Confusingly, the servicer is often, but not 
always, a corporate affiliate of originator; most of the major servicers are subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies:  Countrywide Home Loans (Bank of America); CitiMortgage 
and CitiFinancial (Citigroup); Select Portfolio Servicing (Credit Suisse); Litton Loan 
Servicing LP (Goldman Sachs); Chase Home Finance and EMC Mortgage (JPMorgan 
Chase); Wilshire Credit (Merrill Lynch); Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and Homeq 
Servicing (Wells Fargo). 
Securitization creates numerous obstacles to voluntary loan modifications, but 
they may be reduced to three broad categories:  contractual, practical, and economic.41   
A.   Securitization Creates Contractual Limitations on Private Mortgage 
Modification 
Securitization creates contractual limitations on private mortgage modification.  
These limitations cannot be bypassed except through bankruptcy modification or a taking 
of MBS holders’ property rights.   
Servicers carry out their duties according to what is specified in their contract 
with the SPV.  This contract is known as a “pooling and servicing agreement” or PSA.  
Although the decision to modify mortgages held by an SPV rests with the servicer, and 
servicers are instructed to manage loans as if for their own account, PSAs often place 
restrictions on servicers’ ability to modify mortgages.  Almost all PSAs restrict 
modifications to loans that are in default or where default is imminent or reasonably 
foreseeable in order to protect the SPV’s pass-thru REMIC tax and off-balance sheet 
accounting status.42   
                                              
41 A fourth category—legal obstacles—in the form of REMIC tax provisions and Financial 
Accounting Board standards, are no longer a significant obstacle to modifying securitized loans. There are 
potentially adverse tax and accounting consequences if servicers engaging in too many voluntary 
modifications.  Residential MBS are structured to enjoy pass-thru REMIC (Real Estate Mortgage 
Investment Conduit) status under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1860A et seq., which enables 
the MBS to avoid double taxation of income.  REMIC rules generally preclude wide-scale modification of 
securitized loans or their sale out of securitized pools, and these REMIC rules are further reflected in the 
contract with the servicer.  The IRS has relaxing application of REMIC rules to mortgage loan modification 
programs.  See Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-23 I.R.B. 1054. 
Likewise, accounting standards under SFAS 140 indicate that too many modifications would 
result in the servicer/originator having to take the securitized loans back onto its balance sheet.  SEC Staff, 
however, have indicated that they do not believe that modifications of imminently defaulting loans would 
require on-balance sheet accounting.  Letter from Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman to Rep. Barney Frank, 
Chairman of Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, dated July 24, 
2008, at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/sec_response072507.pdf; Letter from 
Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accounting, SEC to Mr. Arnold Hanish, Chairman of the Committee on Corporate 
Reporting, Financial Executives International and Mr. Sam Ranzilla, Chairman of the Professional Practice 
Executive Committee, The Center for Audit Quality, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
dated Jan.8, 2008, at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/hanish010808.pdf. 
42 See 26 U.S.C. § 1860A et seq. (REMIC treatment); SFAS No. 140 (off-balance sheet accounting 
treatment).   
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PSAs often further restrict modifications:  sometimes the modification is 
forbidden outright, sometimes only certain types of modifications are permitted, and 
sometimes the total number of loans that can be modified is capped (typically at 5% of 
the pool).  Additionally, servicers are frequently required to purchase any loans they 
modify at the face value outstanding (or even with a premium).  This functions as an anti-
modification provision.  
No one has a firm sense of the frequency of contractual limitations to 
modification for residential MBS (RMBS).  A small and unrepresentative sampling by 
Credit Suisse indicates that almost 40% of RMBS PSAs have limitations on loan 
modification beyond a near universal requirement that the a loan be in default or 
imminently defaulting before it may be modified.43  The Credit Suisse study, however, 
did not track all types of modification restrictions, such as face-value repurchase 
provisions, so the true number of restrictive PSAs is likely higher.  Nonetheless, there are 
still a large number of homeowners whose mortgages are held by securitization trusts 
with restrictive PSAs.  This includes both private-label securitizations and GSE 
securitizations; some Fannie Mae securitizations, for example, prohibit any reductions in 
either principal or interest rates.44   
It is virtually impossible to change the terms of a restrictive PSA in order to allow 
the servicer greater freedom to engage in modifications.  The PSA is part of the indenture 
under which the MBS are issued.  Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,45 the consent of 
100% of the MBS holders is needed in order to alter the PSA in a manner that would 
affects the MBS’ cashflow, as any change to the PSA’s modification rules would.  
Practically speaking, it is impossible to gather up 100% of any MBS issue.  There 
can be thousands of MBS certificates from a single pool and these certificate holders 
might be dispersed world-wide.  The problem is exacerbated by collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs), second mortgages, and mortgage insurance.  MBS issued by an SPV 
are typically tranched—divided into different payment priority tiers, each of which will 
have a different dividend rate and a different credit rating.  Because the riskier tranches 
are not investment grade, they cannot be sold to entities like pension plans and mutual 
funds.  Therefore, they are often resecuritized into what are known as CMOs.  A CMO is 
a securitization in which the assets backing the securities are themselves mortgage-
backed securities rather than the underlying mortgages.  CMOs are themselves then 
tranched, and the senior tranches can receive investment grade ratings, making it possible 
to sell them to major institutional investors.  The non-investment grade components of 
                                              
43 Credit Suisse, The Day After Tomorrow:  Payment Shock and Loan Modifications, Fixed 
Income Research, April 5, 2007, at 5.   
44 See, e.g., Federal National Mortgage Association, Single-Family Master Trust Agreement for 
Guaranteed Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates evidencing undivided beneficial interests in Pools of 
Residential Mortgage Loans, June 1, 2007, § 5.3(4), at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/pdf/singlefamilytrustagreement_June2007.pdf (“For so long as a Mortgage 
Loan remains in a Pool, the Mortgage Loan may not be modified if the modification has the effect of 
changing the principal balance (other than as a result of a payment actually received from or on behalf of 
the Borrower), changing the Mortgage Interest Rate (other than in accordance with any adjustable rate 
provisions stated in the Mortgage Documents), or delaying the time of payment beyond the last scheduled 
payment date of that Mortgage Loan.”).  
45 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b). 
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CMOs can themselves be resecuritized once again into what are known as CMO2s.  This 
process can be repeated, of course, an endless number of times.   
The upshot of this financial alchemy is that to control 100% of an MBS issuance 
in order to alter a PSA in any way that would affect cash flows, one would also have to 
own 100% of multiple CMOs to alter the CMOs’ PSAs and of multiple CMO2s to alter 
the CMO2s’ PSAs.  Given that there were 6,815 private-label securitizations from 2001 
thru 2007, not counting many more agency securitizations, and then numerous 
resecuritizations and re-resecuritizations, the scope of the obstacle to voluntary 
modification of PSAs to permit greater servicer discretion is considerable.46   
The impossibility of modifying PSAs to permit modification on a wide scale is 
further complicated because many homeowners have more than one mortgage.  Even if 
the mortgages are from the same lender, they are often securitized separately.  If a 
homeowner is in default on two or three mortgages it is not enough to reassemble the 
MBS pieces to permit a modification of one of the mortgages.  Modification of the senior 
mortgage alone only helps the junior mortgage holders, not the homeowner.  In order for 
a loan modification to be effective for the first mortgage, it is necessary to also modify 
the junior mortgages, which means going through the same process.  This process is 
complicated because senior lenders frequently do not know about the existence of the 
junior lien on the property. 
A further complication comes from insurance.  An SPV’s income can exceed the 
coupons it must pay certificate holders.  The residual value of the SPV after the 
certificate holders are paid is called the Net Interest Margin (NIM).  The NIM is typically 
resecuritized separately into an NIM security (NIMS), and the NIMS is insured by a 
financial institution.  This NIMS insurer holds a position similar to an equity holder for 
the SPV.  The NIMS insurer’s consent is thus typically required both for modifications to 
PSAs and modifications to the underlying mortgages beyond limited thresholds.  NIMS 
insurers’ financial positions are very similar to out-of-the-money junior mortgagees—
they are unlikely to cooperate absent a payout because they have nothing to lose.  
Thus, the contractual structure of securitization creates insurmountable obstacles 
to voluntary, private modifications of distressed and defaulted mortgages, even if that 
would be the most efficient outcome.   
B.   Practical Obstacles to Voluntary Modification 
There are a range of practical difficulties that impede voluntary modification 
programs.  Mortgage servicing is largely a highly scalable, automated transaction 
processing business of collecting payments and remitting them to investors.  Loan 
workouts, however, involve consider manpower and discretion.  Servicers have built their 
businesses around transaction processing and lack sufficient personnel to handle a large 
volume of customer contacts.  Servicers lack the trained loan officers necessary to handle 
the volume of requested modifications, which are essentially the underwriting of a new 
loan.  Servicers often have trouble contacting financially distressed borrowers, and when 
they do, their loan workout overtures are viewed with suspicion because they follow 
months of dunning calls and dunning letters.  And the computer software that servicers 
                                              
46 Inside Mortgage Finance MBS Database.   
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use to do their net present value calculations to compare returns from foreclosure or 
successful modifications may use obsolete inputs, such as assuming that housing prices 
are rising, which will lead servicers to wrongly believe that foreclosure is the best loss 
mitigation outcome.   
C.   Economic Disincentives for Servicers to Engage in Voluntary Modifications 
Securitization also creates serious incentive misalignment problems that can lead 
to inefficient foreclosures.  Mortgage servicer compensation structures create a situation 
in which foreclosure is often more profitable to servicers than loan modification.  
Therefore servicers are incentivized to foreclose rather than modify loans, even if 
modification is in the best interest of the MBS holders and the homeowners.47 
Servicers receive three main types of compensation:  a servicing fee, which is a 
percentage of the outstanding balance of the securitized mortgage pool; float income 
from investing homeowners mortgage payments in the period between when the 
payments are received and when the are remitted to the trust; and ancillary fees.  When a 
loan performs, the servicer has largely fixed-rate compensation.  This is true also when a 
loan performs following a modification.   
Thus, if a servicer modifies a loan in a way that reduces monthly payments, the 
servicer will have a reduced income stream itself.  This reduced income stream will only 
last as long as the loan is in the servicing portfolio.  If the loan is refinanced or redefaults, 
it will leave the portfolio.  Generally servicers do not expect loans to remain in their 
portfolios for very long.  For example, a 2/28 ARM is likely to be refinanced by year 
three, when the teaser rate expires, and move to another servicer’s portfolio.  Moreover, 
for non-GSE RMBS, servicers are not compensated for the sizeable costs of loan 
modification.  Thus, when a servicer modifies a loan, the servicer loses servicing and 
float income (which it will not have long into the future anyhow) and incurs expenses.   
When a servicer forecloses, servicer compensation shifts to a cost-plus basis.  The 
servicer does not receive any additional servicing fee or float revenue from the loan, but 
does receive all expenses of the foreclosure, including any fees it tacks on, such as 
collateral inspection fees, and process serving fees, etc.  These fees are paid off the top 
from foreclosure recoveries, so it is the MBS holders, not the servicer, that incur the loss 
in foreclosure.48  The fees servicers can lard on in foreclosure can be considerable, and 
there is effectively no oversight of their reasonableness or even authorization.49  MBS 
holders lack the ability to monitor servicer decisions, and securitization trustees do not 
have the responsibility to do so.  Servicers are essentially able to receive cost-plus-
percentage-of-cost compensation when foreclosing.  The incentive misalignments from 
                                              
47 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Not Everyone Loses in Foreclosure:  Principal-Agent 
Conflict in Mortgage Backed Securities, working paper, Nov. 17, 2008 (on file with author).   
48 Servicer income in foreclosure is offset in part by the time-value of advancing payments owed 
on defaulted loans to the trust until foreclosure.  These payments are recoverable by the servicer, but 
without interest.  
49 Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims , 87 TEX. L. 
REV. (2008).  
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this form of compensation are so severe that it is flatly prohibited for federal government 
contracts.50 
The choice between modification and foreclosure is a choice between limited 
fixed-price income and a cost-plus contract arrangement with no oversight of either the 
costs or the plus components.  For mortgage servicers, this creates a very strong incentive 
to foreclose on defaulted loans rather than modify them, even if modification is in the 
best interest of the MBS holders.51  The principal-agent conflict between RMBS holders 
and mortgage servicers is a major factor inhibiting voluntary loan modifications.   
III.   PERMITTING MODIFICATION OF ALL MORTGAGES IN BANKRUPTCY WILL NOT 
RESULT IN HIGHER MORTGAGE RATES OR LESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY 
Traditionally, bankruptcy is one of the major mechanisms for resolving financing 
distress.  Bankruptcy creates a legal process through which the market can work out the 
problems created when parties end up with unmanageable debt burdens.  Although the 
process can be a painful one for all parties involved, bankruptcy allows an orderly forum 
for creditors to sort out their share of losses and return the deleveraged debtor to 
productivity; a debtor hopelessly mired in debt has little incentive to be economically 
productive because all of the gain will go to creditors.  Moreover, the existence of the 
bankruptcy system provides a baseline against which consensual debt restructurings can 
occur.  Thus, for over a century bankruptcy has been the social safety net for the middle 
class, joined later by Social Security and unemployment benefits.   
The bankruptcy system, however, is incapable of handling the current home 
foreclosure crisis because of the special protection it gives to most residential mortgage 
claims.  Debtors may generally modify all types of debts in bankruptcy—reducing 
interest rates, stretching out loan tenors, changing amortization schedules, and limiting 
secured claims to the value of collateral (“strip down” or “cram down”).  Under current 
law, debtors can modify mortgages on vacation homes, investor properties, and 
multifamily residences in which the owner occupies a unit.52  Debtors can also currently 
modify wholly unsecured second mortgages on their principal residences,53 as well as 
                                              
50 See 41 U.S.C. § 254(b); 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a).  
51 Alternatively, if a servicer modifies a loan in a way that guarantees a quick redefault, it might be 
even more profitable.  This might explain why so many modifications have resulted in higher monthly 
payments and why a large percentage of foreclosures have been after failed modification plans.  See Jay 
Brinkmann, Mortgage Bankers Association, An Examination of Mortgage Foreclosures, Modifications, 
Repayment Plans, and Other Loss Mitigation Activities in the Third Quarter of 2007, at 10, at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/News/InternalResource/59454_LoanModificationsSurvey.pdf 
(nearly 30% of foreclosure sales in the third quarter of 2007 involved failed repayment plans).   
52 E.g., In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2006) (permitting strip-down on two unit 
property in which the debtor resided); Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Thompson (In re Thompson), 77 
Fed. Appx. 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2003) (permitting strip-down on three unit property in which the debtor resided); 
Lomas Mortg., Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (permitting strip-down on three unit property in 
which the debtor resided). 
53 Every federal circuit court of appeals to address the issue has held that modification, including 
strip-down, of wholly unsecured second mortgages on principal residences is permitted.   See, e.g. Zimmer 
v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp 
(In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 
126 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 288 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. 
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loans secured by yachts, jet-skis, snowmobiles, jewelry, household appliances, furniture, 
cars, trucks, or any other type of personalty.54  
The Bankruptcy Code, however, forbids the modification of mortgage loans 
secured solely by the debtor’s principal residence.55  Single-family owner-occupied 
property mortgage loans must be cured and then paid off according to their original 
terms, including all fees that have been levied since default, or else the bankruptcy 
automatic stay will be lifted, permitting the mortgagee to foreclose on the property.  As a 
result, if a debtor’s financial distress stems from an unaffordable home mortgage, 
bankruptcy is unable to help the debtor retain her home, and foreclosure will occur.   
The Bankruptcy Code’s special protection for home mortgage lenders reflects an 
economic assumption that preventing modification of home mortgage loans in 
bankruptcy limits lenders’ losses and thereby encourages greater mortgage credit 
availability and lower mortgage credit costs, which in turn encourage homeownership.56  
Underlying the economic assumption embedded in the Bankruptcy Code’s anti-
modification provision is another assumption—that mortgage markets are sensitive to 
bankruptcy modification risk.  All existing empirical evidence, however, indicates that 
these assumptions are incorrect.  Mortgage markets are indifferent to bankruptcy 
modification risk.57   
A.   All Empirical Evidence Indicates that Mortgage Markets Are Indifferent to 
Bankruptcy Modification Except at Margins 
There is a simple way to test for market sensitivity to bankruptcy modification:  
compare mortgage interest and insurance rates on property types for which the mortgages 
may currently be modified in bankruptcy with the rates on properties on which the 
mortgages may not be modified in bankruptcy.  Courts have interpreted the Bankruptcy 
Code’s mortgage anti-modification provision to apply only to single-family principal 
residence mortgages.58  Thus, single-family principal residence mortgages may not be 
modified in bankruptcy; all other mortgages may be modified in bankruptcy.  One would 
expect that if the market were sensitive to bankruptcy modification, there would be a risk 
premium for mortgages on the types of property that can currently be modified in 
                                                                                                                                      
Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir. 
BAP), appeal dismissed, 192 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1999).   
54 Until 2005, loans secured by all vehicles could be stripped-down.  Since October 17, 2005, 
purchase money loans secured by motor vehicle may not be stripped-down in their first two-and-a-half 
years, and other purchase money secured loans may not be stripped-down in their first year.  11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a)(9) (hanging paragraph).     
55 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).  Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (parallel residential mortgage anti-
modification provision for Chapter 11).  Section 1322(b)(2) provides that a plan of reorganization may 
“modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in 
real property that is the debtor’s principal residence…”  Since 2005, section 101(13A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code has defined “debtor’s principal residence” as “a residential structure, including incidental property, 
without regard to whether that structure is attached to real property and…includes an individual 
condominium or cooperative unit, a mobile or manufactured home or trailer.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(13A).  State 
law, however, still determines what is “real property.”   
56 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).   
57 Mortgage servicers, however, may not be, as discussed above in section II.C. 
58 See supra note 52. 
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bankruptcy—mortgages on vacation homes, multifamily homes, and investment 
properties—and that this premium would not exist for single-family owner-occupied 
principal residence mortgages, which cannot be modified.   
In an article forthcoming in the Wisconsin Law Review,59 I tested this hypothesis 
using three different pricing measures in mortgage markets:  effective mortgage interest 
rates (annual percentage rates or APRs), private mortgage insurance rates, and secondary 
mortgage market pricing from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In each market I examined 
rate variation by property type in order to isolate the expected risk premium for 
bankruptcy modification risk on non-single-family owner-occupied properties.  All three 
measures indicate that mortgage markets are indifferent to bankruptcy modification risk, 
at least in terms of pricing; the variation in rates in each market does not track with 
bankruptcy modification risk.   
In a companion article-in-progress, coauthored with Joshua Goodman of 
Columbia University, I test the impact of permitting cramdown historically in the period 
before 1993, when it was permitted in many judicial districts.  This historical evidence 
shows scant evidence of market sensitivity.  Historically, in a very different mortgage 
market, we only detect a 12 basis point average impact on interest rates from cramdown, 
and no impact on credit availability.  Current market data, however, suggest no impact 
whatsoever from any ability to modify mortgages in bankruptcy.  Taken together, the 
evidence in these articles suggests that permitting modification of mortgages in 
bankruptcy would have no overall impact on mortgage costs or availability, except at the 
margins.  Marginal, high-risk borrowers might find credit slightly more expensive, but all 
available evidence indicates that there will be no impact on creditworthy borrowers.   
These empirical finding comport with economic theory.  If foreclosure losses are 
greater than bankruptcy modification losses, the market will not price against bankruptcy 
modification.  Evidence from a variety of historical and contemporary sources indicates 
that lenders’ losses from bankruptcy modification would be less than from foreclosure.  
Indeed, by definition a lender cannot do worse in bankruptcy than in foreclosure; 
bankruptcy law provides that a secured lender must receive at least what the lender would 
receive in foreclosure, namely the value of the collateral. 
B.   The Relevant Comparison:  Bankruptcy Losses Versus Foreclosure Losses 
The comparison between loss severities in bankruptcy modification and loss 
severities in foreclosure is a crucial one that many economists miss.60  Most economists 
who have examined bankruptcy modification are inexpert in bankruptcy, mortgage 
foreclosure or both.  As a result they inappropriately view bankruptcy modification as an 
alternative to no lender loss whatsoever, and therefore conclude that because lenders 
would incur losses from modification of mortgages in bankruptcy, they will react by 
increasing cost of mortgages for other borrowers.   
                                              
59 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis:  Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
2009 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming).  
60 See e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role of Bankruptcy Law: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (testimony of Dr. Christopher J. Mayer), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3598&wit_id=7543 (“Economists often point out 
that there is no such thing as a free lunch.”). 
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The problem with this analysis is that the relevant comparison for a lender is not 
between losses from bankruptcy modification and no losses.  Instead, the tradeoff is 
between losses due to modification in bankruptcy and losses due to foreclosure.  Basic 
price theory of demand economics says that the mortgage market will respond to this 
trade-off by pricing against the outcome that results in smaller losses.61  
So which loss will be smaller? Bankruptcy modification losses will generally be 
less than foreclosure sale losses.  By definition a lender cannot do worse in bankruptcy 
than in foreclosure.  The adequate protection provisions of the Bankruptcy Code protect 
lenders from pre-plan confirmation losses due to depreciation,62 and the Bankruptcy Code 
requires that a secured creditor must receive at least what the creditor would receive in 
foreclosure, namely the value of the collateral.63   
There is, of course, the possibility that bankruptcy judges’ valuations of property 
will be lower than foreclosure sale returns.  But there is absolutely no evidence to support 
this belief.  My own empirical research indicates that losses due to cramdown would 
generally be in the 20%-25% range,64 which is less than typical foreclosure losses and far 
less than foreclosure losses in the current market.    
In any case, to the extent that bankruptcy judges’ valuations would sometimes be 
lower than foreclosure sale prices, it will be offset by higher returns on modified loans for 
creditors in some cases.  As long as losses in bankruptcy are no greater than those in 
foreclosure, there should not be any effect on mortgage credit from allowing bankruptcy 
modification.  At worst, then, bankruptcy imposes a time delay on the lender.  If this 
delay is only pre-plan, it is de minimis, and potentially helpful, depending on the housing 
market.  And if a plan fails and results in a delayed foreclosure, the losses from the delay 
would be offset by the additional monthly payments under the plan.  Bankruptcy 
modification will generally result in a lender receiving at least as much as in foreclosure, 
and often more.   
The relevant economic question is one of bankruptcy losses versus foreclosure 
losses, not the straw man comparison between bankruptcy losses and no losses. There is 
no empirical evidence supporting a conclusion that permitting modification of mortgages 
in bankruptcy would have anything other than a de minimis impact on the cost or 
availability of mortgage credit, except for the most risky borrowers.  At best, bankruptcy 
modification will have no impact, and at worst it will have a de minimis impact on the 
                                              
61 This conclusion is consistent with Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and 
Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 177 (2006).  Dr. Pence’s article does not address the question 
of bankruptcy modification loss versus foreclosure loss.  Instead, it deals with the impact of judicial versus 
non-judicial foreclosure on mortgage credit availability.  Dr. Pence finds that there is lower credit 
availability in states that require judicial foreclosure, which is more cumbersome and therefore more 
expensive than non-judicial foreclosure.  The key to understanding Dr. Pence’s findings is that it is loss 
severity due to delay, not delay per se, that affects credit availability.  Thus, while bankruptcy is a longer 
process than foreclosure, as long as it results in smaller loss severities than foreclosure, it will not reduce 
credit availability.   
62 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d).  
63 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).   
64 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis:  Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
2009 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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cost and availability of credit and ensure more prudent and sustainable underwriting 
standards.65 
C.   The Mortgage Bankers Association’s Claim Regarding the Impact of 
Bankruptcy Modification Is Patently False and Disprovable 
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) has claimed that permitting 
modification of mortgages in bankruptcy will result in an effective 200 basis point 
increase in interest rates on single-family owner-occupied properties (“principal 
residences”).66  The MBA figure has varied over the course of the MBA’s lobbying effort 
against bankruptcy reform, shrinking by a quarter to 150 basis points in more recent 
lobbying materials.  The MBA’s methodology for calculating the figure has also 
changed.67  Regardless of size or calculation, the MBA figure is patently false and is the 
result of a cherry-picked comparison. 
The MBA figure is derived from a comparison of the current interest rate spread 
between mortgages on single-family principal residences and on investor properties.68  
The MBA reasons that because single-family principal residence mortgages cannot be 
modified in bankruptcy while investor property mortgages can, then the entire difference 
in mortgage prices for these property types is attributable to bankruptcy modification risk 
for the investor properties.   
The MBA’s claim is demonstrably false.  First, the MBA engages in questionable 
calculations of the price spread.  It includes not only the current additional interest rate 
premium for investor properties of 37.5 basis points, but also amortizes the higher down 
payments and points generally required on investor properties in order to achieve the 200 
(or 150) basis point figure.69   
                                              
65 Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners:  Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 Harv. L & 
Pol’y Rev. (online) (Jan. 19, 2009), at http://www.hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf, at 9. 
66 Statement of David G. Kittle, CMB, Chairman-Elect, Mortgage Bankers Association, Before the 
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on Judiciary, United Stated House of 
Representatives, Oct. 30, 2007, Hearing on “Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect 
Home Ownership and Provide Relief to Consumers in Financial Distress? – Part II,” at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Kittle071030.pdf, at 3. 
67 Id.  The MBA has vacillated in the size of its claim.  More recent MBA press releases have 
claimed only an increase of 150 basis points, without explaining the 50 basis point decline from the 200 
basis point figure featured in Mr. Kittle’s Congressional testimony.  Mortgage Bankers Association, Press 
Release, MBA’s “Stop the Cram Down Resource Center” Puts a Price Tag on Bankruptcy Reform, Jan. 15, 
2008, at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/59343.htm. 
Notably, in response to a request from U.S. Representative Brad Miller (D-N.C.), for clarification 
of its claim, the MBA changed its explanation of the 150 basis point increased cost of mortgages claim 
arguing (without providing any evidence or methodology for the derivation of its numbers) that 70-85 basis 
points would be due to higher default incidence rates, 20-25 basis points would be due to higher loss 
severity rates, 10 basis points would be due to the administrative costs imposed by bankruptcy, and 50-60 
basis points would be due to market uncertainty and increased political risk. Stephen A. O’Connor, Senior 
Vice President of Government Affairs, Mortgage Bankers Association, Letter to Rep. Brad Miller, dated 
April 18, 2008. 
68 Kittle, supra note 66, at 3. 
69 Id.  The MBA’s amortization of the higher down payments typically required on investor 
properties is debatable. Lenders bear no risk on down payments, unlike on interest payments. Down 
payments receive different tax treatment than interest payments for borrowers. And down payments create 
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Even accepting the MBA’s inflated numbers, however, the idea that the entire 
spread in mortgage rates between single-family owner-occupied properties and investor 
properties being due to bankruptcy modification risk is preposterous.70 
The MBA then cherry-picks its evidence to support its lobbying position. The 
MBA could have also compared interest rates spreads between mortgages on single-
family owner occupied properties and mortgages on other property types that can 
currently be modified in bankruptcy—mortgages on multifamily properties or vacation 
homes.  As it turns out, there is no rate spread; conforming mortgages on vacation homes 
and multifamily properties are currently priced the same as single-family principal 
residences.  Only investor property mortgages are priced higher.  The same holds true for 
private mortgage insurance premiums; there is no additional premium for multifamily 
properties at any of the seven major private mortgage insurers, even though multifamily 
property mortgages can be modified in bankruptcy.  The pattern also holds true for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac delivery fees—Fannie and Freddie do not demand 
discounts that track the difference in bankruptcy modification risk.  This means higher 
interest rates on investor properties must be attributed to non-bankruptcy risk factors 
entailed in lending against an investor property.   
There are many non-bankruptcy risk factors that explain the pricing spread on 
mortgages between investment properties and single-family owner occupied properties. 
The higher interest rates and points required on investor properties are explained by 
higher default rates on investor properties, the greater likelihood of investor properties 
being non-recourse, and the more limited secondary market for investor property 
mortgages.  Investor properties have inherently greater default risk in part because an 
investor has the additional rent or mortgage expense that an owner-occupier does not. 
Investor properties also carry a variety of tenant risks—vacancy, nonpayment, and 
damage.  Because investor properties mortgages are often financed through rental 
payments, tenant risk adds to the default risk.  There are myriad risk factors for investor 
properties that single-family owner-occupied properties do not have.  The MBA, of all 
organizations, should recognize that most, if not all, of the price spread between investor 
property mortgages and single-family owner-occupied mortgages is due to factors other 
than bankruptcy modification risk.  Yet the MBA contends that the entire price-spread is 
due to differences in bankruptcy modification risk.  If the MBA revealed a non-cherry-
picked comparison in its lobbying materials, its spurious 150 or 200 basis point claim 
would fall apart.   
                                                                                                                                      
equity in a house, unlike interest.  By amortizing down payments—turning them into interest dollar for 
dollar adjusted for present value— the MBA is wrongly equating two very different types of payments that 
should not be treated as dollar for dollar equivalents. 
70 At the January 29, 2007 Hearing on the Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Identifying 
Solutions and Dispelling Myths, Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representative, David Kittle, the president-elect of the 
MBA claimed that prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code there was no difference in interest rates 
for single-family owner-occupied principal residences and investor properties.  The MBA has produced no 
data or other source to support this assertion, including in response to inquiries from major media outlets, 
and I know of no data source on interest rates that both goes back to 1978 and has rates broken down by 
property type.  Indeed, the idea that investor properties and owner-occupied properties would ever have 
been priced the same, even if there were no bankruptcy system whatsoever, ignores the significant default 
risk entailed in lending against investor properties caused by various tenancy risks. 
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Based on my empirical analysis of a wide variety of mortgage market data,71 there 
is statistically a zero percent chance that the MBA’s 150 or 200 basis point claim is 
correct.  All empirical and market observational data indicates that that MBA’s claim of 
an effective 150-200 basis point increase from allowing strip-down is simply groundless.  
At best the MBA’s figure is a wild and irresponsible guess; at worse it is a deliberately 
concocted falsehood.   
Contrary to the MBA’s spurious claims, all empirical evidence indicates that there 
is unlikely to be anything more than a de minimis effect on interest rates as a result of 
permitting bankruptcy modification. 
IV.   BANKRUPTCY MODIFICATION DOES NOT CREATE A MORAL HAZARD 
 One of the major objections voiced against permitting modification of mortgages 
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy is that it will create a moral hazard and that consumers will be 
tempted to go out and gamble on unaffordable loans because they can always discharge 
their debt in bankruptcy.  This view reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
bankruptcy process and of the problem created by foreclosures.   
A.   Bankruptcy Imposes Significant Costs on Debtors 
Permitting modification of mortgages in Chapter 13 bankruptcies will not create a 
moral hazard problem.  Chapter 13 is not a “drive-by” process.  Debtors’ finances 
become a matter of public record.  Debtors’ credit reports are damaged by the bankruptcy 
filing for up to ten years, raising their future costs of credit.  In order to receive a 
discharge in Chapter 13, a debtor must live on a court-supervised means-tested budget for 
3 or 5 years.72  Having to get the court and the United States Trustee to sign off on the 
reasonableness of daily expenses creates a powerful disincentive against filing for 
bankruptcy unless the filing is absolutely necessary.  Moreover, Chapter 13 insists on full 
repayment of certain debts, including allowed secured claims, domestic support 
obligations, and tax liabilities.73  A below-median-income debtor who does not repay 
creditors in full can only receive a Chapter 13 discharge once every six years; an above-
median-income debtor who does not repay creditors in full can only receive a Chapter 13 
discharge once every ten years.74  This means that the minimum time between repeat 
Chapter 13 filings is longer than the time a foreclosure stays on a credit report.  
Debtors are also unlikely to receive a windfall from Chapter 13 modification.  
Cramdown would only result in the debtor having zero equity in the property, not 
positive equity.  Given the large transaction costs to a sale, debtors are unlikely to sell 
their properties for anything beyond a de minimis profit absent a remarkable recovery of 
the housing market.  
 
                                              
71 See Levitin, supra note 59.  
72 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).   
73 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a); 1325(a)(5). 
74 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(2) prohibits a Chapter 13 discharge if a Chapter 13 discharge was granted 
within two preceding years, but for debtors who do not repay creditors in full, a Chapter 13 plan must last 
at least three of five years, depending on whether the debtor is below or above the applicable state’s median 
income.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1), (4).  Thus, it is the length of plan, not the time between discharges, that 
controls for debtors who have repay less than 100% of their debts.   
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B.   Wealthy Debtors Are Ineligible for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
It is also important to recognize that permitting modification of mortgages in 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy will not result in wealthy or spendthrift debtors receiving 
unmerited relief.  Traditionally, wealthy debtors rarely file for bankruptcy.  The mean 
income of Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers in 2007 was $35,688,75 and less than 10% of all 
debtors earn over $60,000.76   
Part of the reason for this is that Chapter 13 bankruptcy is not available to debtors 
with huge debt burdens.  To file for Chapter 13, an individual must have less than 
$336,900 in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and less than $1,010,650 in 
noncontingent, liquidated secured debts.77  This means that a homeowner with a million 
dollar mortgage cannot avail himself of Chapter 13.  Instead, if that homeowner wishes to 
keep his mansion, he must file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  While there is a parallel 
antimodification provision in Chapter 11,78 adopted after the Supreme Court’s 1993 
Nobelman decision (banning cramdown of principal residence mortgages in Chapter 13) 
in the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, there has been no legislation proposed 
to remove it.79  
C.   Permitting Bankruptcy Modification Would Not Benefit Speculators 
Bankruptcy modification would not yield a windfall to housing speculators 
(“flippers”).80  Many speculators are ineligible for Chapter 13.  The parts of the country 
where there has been the most real estate speculation are also the parts of the country 
with the highest home prices.  In California, where the average loan amount is, according 
to the Mortgage Bankers Association, $331,926,81 three of these mortgages plus a 
$15,000 car loan would make a debtor ineligible for Chapter 13.  Thus, a speculator with 
a fairly average car, a mortgage on his own home, and two investment properties would 
not be eligible for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
Even if the speculator is eligible for Chapter 13, he is unlikely to be able to retain 
his investment properties, much less modify the mortgages thereon.  A mortgage loan 
modification in bankruptcy can occur only as part of a plan.82  The automatic stay would 
likely be lifted on an investment property (or second home) before a plan could be 
confirmed.83  Accordingly, speculators and homeowners intent on keeping their second 
                                              
75 Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?  An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Debtors, AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 361 (2008). 
76 Id. at 360. 
77 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006, 2008 supp.).   
78 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5).  
79 Arguably, 1123(b)(5) is largely unnecessary in light of 1111(b), and its presence deprives 
creditors of their ability to make an 1111(b) election.   
80 This section also holds true for vacation home purchasers. 
81 See Mortgage Bankers Association, Stop the Bankruptcy Cramdown Resource Center, at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/StopTheCramDown. 
82 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (“A plan may…”) (emphasis added).  
83 The Bankruptcy Code provides that the automatic stay shall be lifted for cause, including either 
lack of adequate protection of a secured creditor’s interest in the property—that is payments to compensate 
the secured creditor for depreciation in its collateral during the bankruptcy—or if the debtor does not have 
equity in the property and the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  
Thus, debtors with positive equity who could not handle mortgage payments prepetition would be unlikely 
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homes are unlikely to file for bankruptcy to seek mortgage modification in the first place.  
Permitting bankruptcy modification of primary home mortgages thus steers a true course 
between extending the right sort of relief and not extending it too broadly.   
Even if the speculator is eligible for Chapter 13, he is unlikely to be able to retain 
his investment properties, much less modify the mortgages thereon.  If the speculator is 
eligible for Chapter 13, the automatic stay will likely be lifted on an investor property if it 
is underwater, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2), as the debtor does not have equity in the 
property and it is not necessary for an effective reorganization (unless the debtor’s 
business is being a small-time landlord).  Moreover, in order to prevent the stay from 
being lifted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the speculator would have to provide adequate 
protection, which would be roughly equivalent to rent or mortgage payments, and in a 
falling market additional protection against collateral depreciation would be needed.   
Speculators either cannot or will not make these payments, which are essentially a 
“buy-in” to modifying the mortgage.  As a result the stay will be lifted.  Once the stay is 
lifted, the mortgagee is free to foreclose.  The areas that have been hardest hit by the 
decline in housing prices are areas where there had been prices run ups fueled by 
speculation.  These are the parts of the country where investor properties are most likely 
to be underwater and where the mortgagee would most likely be able to have the stay 
lifted.   
If the speculator were able to avoid the lifting of the automatic stay, the loan 
could only be modified as part of a repayment plan proposed by the debtor, which would 
have to be confirmed by the court84  Plan confirmation might not be possible because of a 
good faith objection under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7) or a disposable income objection under 
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).  Creditors could well argue that it is not good faith for a debtor to 
keep an investment (and keep building up equity in the investment) when they are not 
getting paid in full.  Likewise, unsecured creditors could argue that the debtor is not 
paying all disposable income to them if they are instead paying the investment property 
mortgagee.  The Bankruptcy Code is replete with provisions to protect against abuse by 
small time real estate speculators and it is extremely unlikely that a speculator would be 
able to take advantage of bankruptcy modification. 
D.   Foreclosure Falls Within the Moral Hazard Exception for “Contagion Fires” 
Permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages in order to prevent inefficient 
foreclosures also fits into a well-recognized exception to moral hazard, that for 
“contagion fires.”  It would create a moral hazard for the fire department to rescue people 
from fires caused by smoking in bed, yet we rescue in-bed smokers without hesitation, in 
part because fires can spread and harm third-parties, like neighbors.  Foreclosures 
function like fires, and a rash of foreclosures can destroy property values throughout a 
neighborhood.   
                                                                                                                                      
to be able to make the adequate protection payments necessary to prevent the lifting of the stay, 11 U.S.C. § 
362(d)(1), and debtors with negative equity would find the stay lifted because investment properties and 
second homes are not essential to their reorganizations.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).  
84 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321; 1322(b)(2) (“A plan may…”) (emphasis added); 1325.   
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Moral hazard concerns are inapplicable given the immense third-party costs of 
foreclosures, and the Bankruptcy Code already has powerful antidotes to moral hazard 
risk.  Concerns about more than isolated serial and strategic filings are greatly overstated 
and unsupported by empirical evidence.  
The concern over moral hazard in bankruptcy is more an economists’ fantasy than 
an empirically grounded reflection of real Americans’ behavior.  Americans do not 
behave as strategically with bankruptcy as economists like to believe people act.  While 
there are undoubtedly some debtors who abuse bankruptcy, there are numerous 
safeguards built into the system to discourage strategic use of the bankruptcy system, and 
there is no evidence suggesting that abusive debtors are anything other than a small 
minority.  Most debtors are confused, ashamed, and unhappy.  They don’t want to be in 
bankruptcy; it is a last choice option for them, not a cold calculated decision.  Simply put, 
economists are far more likely to file for bankruptcy than actual consumers.   
E.  Bankruptcy Modification Would Not Produce a Windfall to Debtors If Property 
Values Later Appreciate 
It is also important to note that bankruptcy modification that reduces loan 
principal does not produce a windfall for a debtor, even if the property later appreciates.  
The debtor cannot benefit from the appreciation during the course of the plan.  If the 
mortgage appreciates in the three to five years of a plan, the debtor can only benefit upon 
a sale or disposition of the house.  If the debtor sells the house at an appreciated value 
during the term of the plan, the debtor’s income from the sale will be available to satisfy 
unsecured claims, including any unsecured mortgage claim that results from bifurcation 
under section 506(a).85  Thus, there is no windfall possible for the debtor in the short 
term.   
If the property appreciates in the long term (5-40 years potentially under H.R. 200 
or H.R. 225), that appreciation would belong to the debtor, but the debtor has a better 
claim to it than the mortgagee.   
Seen from a perspective of the original loan, letting the debtor keep future 
appreciation looks like a windfall.  But this is the wrong perspective.  The original loan 
was unable to perform, and insisting on its terms would have resulted in foreclosure.  
When a property is sold in foreclosure, the foreclosing creditor does not receive the 
future appreciation on the property; that belongs to the foreclosure sale purchaser.  
Giving the creditor more in bankruptcy than the creditor would have received in a 
foreclosure is a windfall to the creditor, not the debtor.  The creditor has already been 
rewarded in bankruptcy by getting a loan modification that will provide at least the value 
the creditor would have received in foreclosure.  If the creditor were able to claw back 
future appreciation, the bankruptcy modification would be equivalent to a temporary loan 
modification, and temporary modifications are less likely to succeed than life-of-the-loan 
modifications.   
In the case of securitized loans, permitting an appreciation claw back would also 
reward precisely the parties whose irresponsible behavior created the foreclosure crisis.  
                                              
85 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (requiring debtors to commit all disposable income to unsecured 
creditors), 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (permitting modification of a plan to account for increases in debtor’s income).  
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Securitization trusts are often short-lived entities.  When the outstanding principal 
balance reaches a certain threshold, often 10%, the servicer will exercise a “clean-up 
call” and purchase out the remaining balance from the trust; it is not economical for the 
servicer to service small balances.  Most trusts reach this “clean up call” threshold in their 
first seven years, as loans are refinanced out of the trust or default.  Thus, the trust that 
owned the mortgage at the time of bankruptcy may well not exist to receive the shared 
appreciation.  Instead, the clawed back appreciation would accrue to the party who held 
the residual rights in the mortgages—often the servicer/originator.    
This is particularly troubling because in many cases principal reductions are 
necessary because the original lender condoned or even encouraged inflated property 
appraisals in order to make larger loans that it could then securitize for more money.  
Thus, rather than being a windfall to debtors, an appreciation claw back would reward the 
very entities that fueled the mortgage bubble through irresponsible lending.   
Finally, it is important to emphasize that appreciation clawbacks do not exist for 
any other sort of lien stripping in bankruptcy.  Likewise, unsecured creditors do not get to 
claim future income or assets after the debtor is discharged.  Even if the debtor wins the 
lottery the next day, the core bankruptcy policy of the fresh start emphasizes that pre-
petition creditors have no claim on post-discharge assets.   
V.   POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE BILL 
A.   Equalize Treatment of Bankruptcies and Foreclosures on Credit Reports 
The legislation could be improved by changing section 605(a)(1) of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act,86 to provide that Title 11 case may not remain on a credit report for 
more than seven years.  Currently Title 11 cases may remain on credit reports for up to 
ten years, while all other adverse reports, including foreclosures, may remain on credit 
reports for only up to seven years.  The unequal weighting of bankruptcy filings and other 
defaults on credit reports creates a disincentive for bankruptcy filings and should be 
changed.   
The unequal weighting of foreclosures and bankruptcies on credit reports bears no 
correlation with lenders’ ultimate recovery on their loans.  Nor does it provide much 
protection to potential creditors, as there is only a two-year window under which two 
Chapter 7 discharges could appear on a credit report,87 and serial bankruptcy filers will 
have sufficient other adverse entries on their credit reports to alert potential creditors of 
risk.  Equalizing the treatment of bankruptcies and other defaults on credit reports would 
simply lead to bankruptcy being treated as a default on all reported debts, which is 
exactly what it is.  
The Bankruptcy Code already has provisions to address the potential problem of 
serial bankruptcy filers;88 credit reporting is not the place to do so.  Bankruptcy is 
sometimes both the responsible, efficient, and fair course of action, and it should not be 
disincentivized relative to a non-bankruptcy default.  Moreover, leaving bankruptcies on 
credit reports longer than other types of defaults interferes with the core bankruptcy 
                                              
86 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1). 
87 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (requiring eight years between Chapter 7 discharges).   
88 See, 11 U.S.C. §§727(a)(8)-(9); 1328(f).   
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policy of the fresh start for honest but unfortunate debtors.  Bankruptcy filings should be 
treated like any other default for the purposes of credit reporting.89  
Notably, when the FCRA was enacted in 1970, it provided that bankruptcy filings 
could remain on credit reports for fourteen years, while all other types of adverse entries 
could only remain on reports for seven years.  When Congress passed the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 that created the current Bankruptcy Code, the House bill included an 
amendment by Representative McKinney of Connecticut that would have reduced the 
time bankruptcy remains on a credit report from fourteen to seven years.  Representative 
McKinney noted that “an exhaustive search of the legislative history of [the fourteen 
year] provision has disclosed no compelling reason for the statute’s unforgivingly lengthy 
memory.”90 While Representative Butler noted that “The purpose of the provision was to 
keep the record open long enough so that creditors could determine whether the 
individual had filed more than one bankruptcy,”91 this reason is simply inapplicable in the 
world of modern, instantaneous, computerized credit scoring.  Indeed, even at the time, 
Representative Butler did not think it was reason enough and supported the amendment.  
Yet the enrolled version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act only reduced the time that 
bankruptcy remains on credit report from fourteen to ten years,92 in a compromise 
between the Senate and House.93   
Unfortunately, this compromise creates an imbalance in credit reporting treatment 
that favors foreclosure to bankruptcy filing.  Given that bankruptcy modification of 
mortgages presents an important potential tool for helping homeowners keep their homes 
and benefiting all parties at interest—homeowners, lenders, and communities—it is 
important to amend the FCRA to provide for equal treatment of bankruptcy and 
foreclosure.  
B.   Permit Mortgage Modification in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Any changes made to section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code should also be 
made to its parallel Chapter 11 provision, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5).94  Debtors who have 
too much debt to qualify for Chapter 13 are not particularly sympathetic characters.  But 
for inflated real estate markets like California, there are far-from-wealthy debtors who 
have mortgage and auto loan debt that exceeds $750,000, making them ineligible for 
Chapter 13.  Making a parallel change in Chapter 11 would have even less impact on 
creditors, not just because of the relative rarity of individual Chapter 11 filers, but also 
because in Chapter 11 creditors have the protection of a plan vote and, for undersecured 
creditors, an 1111(b) election, which allows them to avoid cramdown.   
 
                                              
89 I do not express an opinion on the length of time a bankruptcy or other default should be on a 
credit report, only that they should not receive disparate treatment.   
90 124 CONG. REC. H1799, Feb. 1, 1978 (statement of Rep. Stuart Brett McKinney (R-Conn.)). 
91 Id. (statement of Rep. Manley Caldwell Butler, R.-Va.). 
92 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, P.L. 95-598, § 312(b), 92 Stat. 2676 (Nov. 6, 1978). 
93 124 CONG. REC. H32411, Sept. 28, 1978; S34011 Oct. 5, 1978. 
94 Mortgage modification is already possible in Chapter 12 family farm or fisherman bankruptcies.  
11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy modification presents the best and most powerful solution to the 
foreclosure crisis.  It presents an impressive list of features: 
• Immediate solution  
• No cost to taxpayers 
• Addresses both negative equity and payment reset shock 
• Addresses the contractual and incentive problems created by 
securitization; cuts servicers out of the modification decision 
• Addresses the problem of second lien mortgages 
• No moral hazard problem 
• No costs for future borrowers 
• Screens out speculators 
• Forces losses to be shared by lender and borrowers 
• Encourages voluntary modifications 
In a perfectly functioning market without agency and transaction costs, lenders 
would be engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or distressed mortgage loans, 
as the lenders would prefer a smaller loss from modification than a larger loss from 
foreclosure.  Voluntarily modification, however, has not been happening on a large 
scale95 for a variety of reasons,96 most notably contractual impediments, agency costs, 
practical impediments, and other transaction costs.  
If all distressed mortgages could be modified in bankruptcy, it would provide a 
method for bypassing the various contractual, agency, and other transactional 
inefficiencies.  Permitting bankruptcy modification would give homeowners the option to 
force a workout of the mortgage, subject to the limitations provided by the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Moreover, the possibility of a bankruptcy modification would encourage 
voluntary modifications, as mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over 
the shape of the modification. An involuntary public system of mortgage modification 
would actually help foster voluntary, private solutions to the mortgage crisis. 
Unlike possible programs for government refinancing or guarantee of distressed 
mortgages, the bankruptcy system is immediately available to resolve the mortgage crisis.  
Government refinancing or guarantee plans would take months to implement, during 
which time foreclosures would continue.  In contrast, bankruptcy courts are experienced, 
up-and-running, and currently overstaffed relative to historic caseloads.  Moreover, the 
bankruptcy automatic stay would immediately halt any foreclosure action in process upon 
                                              
95 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Mortgage Metrics Report:  Analysis 
and Disclosure of National Bank Mortgage Loan Data, October 2007-March, 2008, at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-65b.pdf. 
96 See Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE (2007). 
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a homeowner’s filing of a bankruptcy petition.97  And, unlike government guarantees or 
refinancing, bankruptcy modification of all mortgages would not involve taxpayer 
dollars.   
Bankruptcy modification would not impose costs on future borrowers except at 
the very margins.  A wide range of empirical data show that permitting bankruptcy 
modification of all mortgages would have little or no impact on mortgage credit cost or 
availability.  Because lenders face smaller losses from bankruptcy modification than from 
foreclosure, the market will not price against bankruptcy modification.   
Bankruptcy modification would also avoid the moral hazard for lenders and 
borrowers of a bailout.  Lenders would incur costs for having made poor lending 
decisions thru limited recoveries.  Borrowers would face the requirement of living for 
three or five years on a court-supervised budget in which all disposable income goes to 
creditors, a damaged credit rating, and the inability to file for bankruptcy for a number of 
years. 
Bankruptcy modification also provides an excellent device for sorting out types of 
mortgage debtors.  It can correct the two distinct mortgage problems in the current crisis–
payment reset shock from resetting adjustable rate mortgages and negative equity from 
rapidly depreciating home prices—while preventing speculators and vacation home 
purchasers from enjoying the benefits of modification.  And, by providing an efficient 
and fair system for restructuring debts and allocating losses, bankruptcy will help 
stabilize the housing market. 
Allowing bankruptcy to serve as a forum for distressed homeowners to restructure 
their mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method for resolving the 
foreclosure crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets.  Unlike any other proposed response, 
bankruptcy modification offers immediate relief, solves the market problems created by 
securitization, addresses both problems of payment reset shock and negative equity, 
screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers and lenders, and avoids both 
the costs and moral hazard of a government bailout.  
Permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy would thus create a low-
cost, effective, fair, and immediately available method for resolving much of the current 
foreclosure crisis without imposing costs taxpayers, creating a moral hazard for 
borrowers or lenders, or increasing mortgage credit costs or decreasing mortgage credit 
availability.  As the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best 
and least invasive method of stabilizing the housing market and is a crucial step in 
stabilizing financial markets. 
                                              
97 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).   
